Labour's narrowed social base
Labour emerged from the general election massively increasing its number of seats but losing votes. Labour now stands on a narrowed social base.
The theory adopted by the Labour leadership was that in order to win it had to focus on groups of potential switchers and take its core support for granted. By pursuing this course Labour failed to generate enthusiasm amongst its own base, translating into a falling total number of votes, a static vote share, a low turnout and even the loss of two members of the shadow cabinet.
In terms of the share of the vote Labour secured 33.7 per cent at the general election - only slightly up on the 32.2 per cent the party won in its 2019 defeat, and considerably less than the 40 per cent of the electorate voting Labour in 2017.
Turnout was down, reduced to its lowest level since 2001. Going further, the IPPR argues that just over half of Britain’s adults voted at the 2024 general election, making it the lowest turnout by share of population since universal suffrage.
At 33.7 per cent Labour’s percentage share of the vote is closer to the defeats of 1987 (30.8 per cent), 1992 (34.4 per cent), 2010 (29.0 per cent), 2015 (30.4 per cent), and 2019 (32.2 per cent), than it is to the big Labour wins of 1997 (43.2 per cent) and 2001 (40.7 per cent). 2024’s vote share is some way off Labour’s 2017 share at 40 per cent, in which Labour delivered an increased vote for the first time since 1997, before falling back again in 2019.
Labour’s share of the vote barely rose in England at all, and in Wales it went backwards. Almost all of Labour’s small increase in the share of the vote is accounted for in Scotland where the SNP has spun off into a deep crisis.
Within the overall result, Labour’s support fell amongst the least well-off sections of the working class. Labour offered no clear plan to raise living standards, fend off the the collapse in disposable household incomes, or to turn around austerity in the public services. The FT’s chief data reporter John Burn-Murdoch has shown that Labour won ‘its lowest ever share of the vote in deprived areas (<50% for the first time), and its highest ever share in affluent areas.’ As he argues: ‘the result is a dramatic flattening of the class gradient in Labour support.’
The most clear indication of Labour’s reduced social base is the decline in the total number of votes cast for the party on July 4th. Labour polled 9,704,655 in 2024, lower than the 10,269,051 who voted Labour in 2019, and significantly lower than the 12,877,918 who voted Labour in 2017, both under Jeremy Corbyn. Tracking the number of people voting Labour at every general election from the first Thatcher government in 1979 to the present, the total in 2024 stands at eighth out of twelve. Labour’s number of votes in 2024 is close to Tony Blair’s third election in 2005, a time when Labour was seen to be shedding millions of voters, and only 357,331 more votes than Labour’s defeat in 2015 with Ed Miliband as leader.
Total Labour votes in general elections 1979-2024
1997 13,518,167
2017 12,877,918
1992 11,560,484
1979 11,532,218
2001 10,724,953
2019 10,269,051
1987 10,029,807
2024 9,704,655
2005 9,552,436
2015 9,347,324
2010 8,606,517
1983 8,456,934
Far from a tidal wave of support for Labour, 2024 was a Tory collapse. Labour led the Tories in the polls consistently from early 2022. Those poll leads expanded in some cases to extremely wide numbers by the end of that year, and settled into polling at around forty per cent or above up until Sunak called the general election in May 2024. The election campaign actually saw a drop in Labour’s support from the forties down to its eventual 33.7 per cent. What led to the Conservatives’ wipe-out was the dire position of the party as it went into the election and then the intervention of the hard-right Reform party, whose vote rose by 12.3 per cent, dragging the chair from under the Tories.
For some, Labour’s low share of the vote can be explained by voters believing that Labour would win in any case, and therefore feeling free to vote for an alternative. But this avoids addressing why voters would want to opt out of voting Labour at all. The Tories were loathed by the time of their defeat - it is not unreasonable to think that the party about to replace them might benefit from a surge of support. Instead, through a combination of its rightward trajectory and its position on Gaza it saw an erosion of support amongst sections of the electorate, primarily in the cities. It allowed the Greens to make advances – including shadow secretary of state for culture, media and sport, Thangam Debbonaire losing to the Greens’ co-leader Carla Denyer in Bristol Central.
Through its attack on the left Labour lost its chance to take Chingford and Woodford Green from the incumbent Tory Iain Duncan-Smith, whilst Jeremy Corbyn defeated Labour in Islington North.
There is no doubt that Gaza has continued to reverberate through British politics. Thangam Debbonaire has argued that Labour’s "lack of a strong narrative" around Gaza during the election "had consequences". But that is not right: the failure was not that Labour did not tell its story over Gaza well enough, but rather that its bad line was very clearly grasped by those parts of the electorate that cared most strongly about it – including, but by no means limited to, the Muslim communities. Labour’s problems erupted from the point of Keir Starmer’s infamous LBC interview. By saying in answer to whether Israel has the right to implement a siege and withhold power and water from the population of Gaza that ‘I think that Israel does have that right,’ Keir Starmer caused a huge backlash both inside and outside the Labour party. Not an aberration but a sustained line, Starmer’s approach was reinforced. Shadow Attorney General Emily Thornberry was put up on Newsnight to repeatedly refuse to answer whether cutting off food, water and power in Gaza was contrary to international law. Shadow Foreign Secretary David Lammy refused to say whether he backed Israel’s order for the forced displacement of one million people in Gaza, saying it is ‘not a yes or no question’ and ‘war is ugly.’ The question of Labour’s position was well understood up to and including its refusal to vote for a motion calling for a ceasefire because the wording contained a reference to the ‘collective punishment’ of the Palestinians. Right up to this day Labour is not calling for an end to arms sales to Israel.
The consequence of Labour’s position on Gaza was that the party lost its Shadow Paymaster General – Jonathan Ashworth – in Leicester South to Shockat Adam. Adam was one of four pro-Palestine independents elected in addition to Jeremy Corbyn: in Birmingham Perry Barr, Blackburn and Dewsbury & Batley. Each one of these results is entirely down to the actions of the Labour leadership. In addition to these seats, Labour sustained significant collapses in its vote in other seats. Health Secretary Wes Streeting lost twenty per cent from his vote share in Ilford North, with a pro-Palestine independent Leanne Mohammed just 528 votes behind him. Jess Phillips’ vote fell by 26.9 per cent in Birmingham Yardley, with a margin of victory of just 693 over another pro-Palestine independent. Shabanna Mahmood’s vote fell by 40.5 per cent in Birmingham Ladywood.
To illustrate how far Labour took its own supporters for granted in the course of the last parliament, even the incoming Prime Minister saw his support drop by 17.4 per cent in his constituency of Holborn & St Pancras, where he was challenged by the pro-Palestine left wing candidate Andrew Feinstein. Starmer obtained 48.9 per cent of the vote, with Feinstein on 18.9 per cent. Starmer’s support fell from 36,641 in 2019 to 18,884 votes at this election. Keir Starmer’s total vote was the third lowest ever recorded in Holborn & St Pancras since the seat was created in 1983. The total number of votes cast for Starmer in Camden in 2024 was massively down from the 41,343 who voted for him in 2017.
Many have emphasised the ‘efficiency’ of Labour’s vote, but efficiency and increased popularity need not be mutually exclusive. The party of British social democracy goes into government with a reduced social base, the beneficiary of a Tory collapse and a surge of the hard right Reform party.